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In section 145 of A Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge George Berkeley offers an 
account of how one might justify the claim that there 
are minds other than one's own. According to this 
account, if a person perceives ideas of a certain sort, 
then there is an external mental substance, i.e., a mind, 
of which these ideas are "effects or concomitant signs."1 
On the other hand, in section 18 Berkeley argues against 
the view that perceiving ideas provides a criterion for 
the existence of external material substances, i.e., 
physical or corporeal objects. ÄTter explicating the 
arguments in sections 145 and 18, respectively, I will 
show that if one holds that Berkeley's attack in section 
18 is sound, then one must reject Berkeley's own argument 
in section 145. 
Section 145 of the Principles encapsulates Berkeley's 
view of how one mind knows about other minds: 
From what has been said it is plain that we 
cannot know the existence of other spirits 
otherwise than by their operations, or the 
ideas by them excited in us. I perceive 
several motions, changes, and combinations 
of ideas that inform me that there are 
certain particular agents, like myself, 
which accompany them and concur in their 
production. Hence the knowledge I have of 
other spirits is not immediate, as is the 
knowledge of my ideas, but depending on the 
intervention of ideas, by me referred to 
agents or spirits distinct from myself, as 
effects or concomitant signs, (p. 324) 
We may set a context for this passage as follows: 
suppose I say to myself, "There are minds other than my 
own," and then pause and ask myslef, "How do I know this 
to be true?" According to Berkeley, the appropriate 
answer is, "I know that 1(a), K b ) , and 1(c) are true, 
hence 1(d) is true and I am justified in believing so," 
where 1(a), K b ) , 1(c), and 1(d) are: 
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1(a) I am mind. 
K b ) I perceive certain ideas x^, X j , . . . x R of 
the sort C. 
1(c) If a mind perceives ideas of the sort C, 
then there exists a mind M2» distinct from 
M]_, of which the ideas are "effects or 
concomitant signs." 
ergo 1(d) There exists a mind, distinct from me, 
of which x,, X 2 , . . x n are "effects or 
concomitant signs." 
There are at least three things about this argument 
which warrant explanation. First of all, let us note 
that Berkeley used 'idea' to denote that which is per-
ceived; hence tables, chairs, the moon, etc., as well as 
freedom, squareness, and redness are all ideas in this 
sense. For the purposes of this discussion, we shall 
ignore the problems associated with Berkeley's usage of 
the word 'idea.' 
Secondly, let us note that premise 1(c) begins with 
"If I perceive ideas of the sort C, . . ." rather than 
"If I perceive the ideas x^, X 2 » • • • xn» • • • 
The reason for this may best be illustrated by an example 
suppose (taking Berkeley's view of perception) I per-
ceive a certain pattern of ideas consisting of a man 
speaking in English in an intelligible and coherent way, 
and I conclude that there is another mind which caused 
me to perceive the man and his linguistic behavior. 
But what was most relevant to my conclusion in this 
scenario was that I perceived some man uttering some 
sequence of English sentences, not strictly that I 
perceived this man uttering that sequence of English 
sentences. Hence I drew the conclusion because I 
perceived ideas of a certain sort, i.e., because the 
ideas conformed to the general pattern "man speaking 
coherently in English." My principle of inference was 
not "If I perceive this man uttering these sentences, 
then there exists another mind"; rather, it was "If 
I perceive a man uttering coherent English sentences, 
then there exists another mind." Of course the problem 
of how Berkeley (or anyone else) could establish which 
sorts of ideas imply the existence of another mind is 
very complex, and I do not propose to address that 
problem here. 
Thirdly, one might object to my use of "I perceive 
certain ideas x^, X 2 , . . ., x n . . ."in 1(a) instead of Berkeley's "I perceive several motions, changes, and 
combinations of ideas." But Berkeley's view is that the 
objects of perception are all and only ideas, hence 
Berkeley's "motions, changes, and combinations of ideas" 
are perceived if and only if they are themselves ideas. 
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Of course there are serious problems about calling a 
collection or combination of ideas an idea, but Berkeley's 
view is that one may do so, and I shall not deal further 
with the issue here. 
In section 18 of the Principles Berkeley attacks 
one kind of justification for belief in material 
substance: 
It remains therefore that if we have any 
knowledge at all of external things, it must 
be by reason, inferring their existence from 
what is immediately perceived by sense . . . . 
I say it is granted on all hands (and what 
happens in dreams, frenzies and the like, puts 
it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might 
be affected with all the ideas we have now, 
though no bodies existed without resembling 
them. Hence it is evident the supposition of 
external bodies is not necessary for the 
producing our ideas; since it is granted 
that they are produced sometimes, and might 
possibly be produced always in the same order 
we see them in at present, without their 
concurrence.3 
We may set the context for this passage much as 
we did for section 14 5: suppose I say to someone, 
"There are external material substances," and the 
other person replies, "How do you know"? Berkeley 
claims that it is not acceptable to reply, "I know that 
2(d) is true because I know that 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) 
are true"; where 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) are as 
follows: 
2(a) I am a mind. 
2(b) I perceive certain ideas yi, y 2, • • •,y m of 
the sort S. 
2(c) If a mind M perceives ideas of the sort S, 
then there is some material substance which 
caused M to perceive these ideas. 
ergo 2(d) There is some material substance which 
caused me to perceive y^, y 2, • • •> ym« 
The role of "of the sort S" in this argument is 
identical to that of "of the sort C" in the first argu-
ment, except that ideas of the sort S will be ideas such 
as "a firm, red, tasty, fragrant apple" or "a hard, 
heavy, silver colored sphere." 
Berkeley attacks 2(a)-2(d) in section 18 by appeal-
ing to the following argument: 
' 1 8 
3(a) For any subset D of our ideas, it is 
possible for the elements of D to be 
imprinted on a dreaming or frenzied 
person's mind. 
3(b) The imprinting of ideas on a dreaming 
or frenzied mind need not be caused by 
any external material substance. 
3(c) If 3(a) and 3(b), then for any subset 
D of our ideas, it is possible that 
there exist a mind MQ such that M Q 
perceives the members of D , but no 
material substance causes Mo to 
perceive any member of D. 
ergo P For any subset D of our ideas, it 
is possible that there exist a mind 
M Q such that M Q perceives the members 
of D but no material substance causes 
MQ to perceive any member of D. 
Clearly, P contradicts premise 2(c), since P says 
that the existence of a material substance is not a 
necessary condition for the perception of any idea, 
including ideas of the sort S. 
I will now show that given the above argument for 
P, and given Berkeley's assumptions about perception, 
one must reject the argument from section 145 as well 
as the argument attacked in section 18. I will proceed 
as follows: (i) I will show that if one accepts the 
argument for P , then one must accept P', where P' is as 
follows: 
P' For any subset D of our ideas, it is 
possible that there exist a mind M Q such 
that M Q perceives each member of D , but 
no mental substance external to M Q 
causes or concurs in Mo's perception of 
the members of D. 
And (ii) I will show that P 1 undermines the argu-
ment from section 145. 
A crucial feature of the argument from 3(a), 3(b), 
and 3(c) to P is the fact that Berkeley uses the examples 
of "dreams, frenzies, and the like" to prove his point. 
In particular, he notes that in such cases the perception 
of ideas need not be caused by external matter, even on 
the view of the materialists. But in the case of a 
dream or frenzy it may also happen that no external 
mental substance causes an idea to be perceived, as 
when one dreams about carrying on a conversation with 
someone else.14 Hence we may assert the following: 
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3(b)* The imprinting of an idea on a dreaming 
or frenzied mind need not be caused by 
any external mental substance. 
Hence one may draw a conclusion parallel to Berkeley's 
conclusion in section 1 8 , viz., it is possible I might be 
affected with all the ideas I have now, though no minds 
existed outside me causing these ideas or exciting them 
in me. In other words, we have the following parallel 
to premise 3(c) above: 
3(c)* If 3(a) and 3(b), then for any subset D of 
our ideas, it is possible that there exist 
a mind HQ such that M Q perceives each 
member of D, but no mental substance 
external to M Q causes or concurs in M Q ' S 
perception of the members of D. 
Clearly, if 3(a), 3(b)*, and 3(c)*, then P' follows; 
thus if one accepts the argument for P, then one must 
accept P 1 as well, since we arrived at 3(b)* and 3(c)* 
on the basis of Berkeley's argument for P and a few 
observations concerning dreams or hallucinations in 
which one is conversing with someone else. But P' 
contradicts premise 1(c), just as P contradicted premise 
2(c); that is P 1 says that the existence of an external 
mental substance is not a necessary condition for the 
perception of any idea, including, of course, ideas of 
the type C. 
One might object that it is ad hoc to make my point 
in this paper by using a parenthetical remark which, 
perhaps, Berkeley need not have made, viz. " . . . and 
what happens in dreams, frenzies and the like, puts it 
beyond dispute . . . ." My response is that Berkeley's 
appeal to "dreams, frenzies, and the like" is no mere 
parenthetical remark; the general acceptance during the 
modern period of a Cartesian or quasi-Cartesian problem 
of dreams and hallucinations was the very reason why 
P was "granted on all hands" during Berkeley's lifetime. 
What all of this comes to is that Berkeley cannot 
have it both ways; that is, lie cannot reject a repre-
sentational account of knowledge of external objects 
yet hold to a representational account of knowledge of 
other minds. Consequently, Berkeley's immaterialism 
leads irrevocably to solipsism, where solipsism is taken 
here to mean the inability to justify, and hence the 
inability to know, that there are minds other than one's 
own. Needless to say, this is one result that Berkeley 
most surely hoped to avoid.5 
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NOTES 
"""George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Colin Murray Turbayne, 
(New York: Bobbs-Memll Company, Inc., 1970), p. 32M. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 25M. 
l,0ne might object that in this argument, as well 
as in Berkeley's argument from section 18, the difference 
between imagined and perceived ideas has been con-
veniently ignored, i.e. , the term "imprinted on the 
mind" should mean one thing for perceived ideas and 
quite another for imagined ideas. I suppose that 
although Berkeley claims that imagined ideas are "less 
vivid" than perceived ideas (cf. Principles section 33), 
he would reply to this objection by claiming that some 
"dreams, frenzies, and the like" are so vivid that the 
imagined ideas involved are virtually indistinguishable 
from perceived ideas, as in Descartes' dreams about 
sitting at his desk writing. Hence (Berkeley might 
argue) even if all perceived ideas had material causes, 
one could not know that some particular idea had a 
material cause since that idea might only be a very 
vivid imagined idea. In other words, premise 2(c) 
might be true, but one could never know that it was true. 
^In writing this paper I profited very much from 
conversations with Greg Gelvin and Edwin Allaire. 
